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Shakespeare and the Concepts of
Fear
Robert Appelbaum
1 I say the concepts of fear, not concept, for there are many of them. The word fear itself is
polysemantic,  and  explanations  of  fear  range  from  the  clinical  and  neural  to  the
philosophical. There are also many related terms, which are commonly used to indicate
states of mind or emotions that are not quite “fear” but something a little different, or
several things a little bit different, or very much different, as the case may be. Anxiety,
terror, horror, panic are among these terms, all of them certainly bearing resemblances
to  fear  but  also  indicating  separate  kinds  of  states  of  mind.  These  terms  too  are
polysemantic and can be explained in a large number of different ways.
2 Given this variegated conceptual and terminological field, my purpose here, to adopt an
expression of Raymond Carver’s, is to ask “What do we talk about when we talk about
fear?” And to go one step further, “What do we talk about when we talk about fear in
Shakespeare?” There is a gap between the two questions. Our own common discourses of
fear  and  similar  phenomena  have  been  affected  by  conditions  unknown  and
unforeseeable by Shakespeare, ranging from the invention of nuclear weaponry to the
development of cognitive science, not to mention the evolution of the English language.
Our minds are attuned to fear in many new ways. We may or may not have more to fear
today1 –  after  all,  if  we  can  fear  nuclear  war,  terrorism,  cybercrime,  environmental
catastrophe  and  the  human  immunodeficiency  virus,  early  moderns  could  fear  the
Apocalypse. They could fear hell. They could fear hunger and invasion. They could fear
military disasters. They could fear the plague and many other diseases for which there
was no effective cure.2 But whether or not we have more to fear, we have many different
objects of fear, and different ways of accounting for it. So a gap of time yawns between
then and now. Yet there is also a continuity between the two questions. In this essay I will
try to illustrate some of those gaps and continuities, and hopefully clarify what it is, or
rather what those many things are, that we talk about when we talk about fear – and
especially in Shakespeare.  I  will  then go on to illustrate one of  the lines of  thinking
opened up by a consideration of the concepts of fear with reference to Hamlet.
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3 I start with a list of words and a few expressions, then. It is not exhaustive or systematic
but it is indicative of the wide range of concepts of fear today, and in most cases of the
concepts  of  fear  that  either  appear  in  Shakespeare,  though  perhaps  with  different












“I fear that …”
“I am afraid that …”
“I dare not …”
4 Little by little in what follows I go on to provide applications and examples. There are
some surprises ahead. They issue in part from the main premise informing this paper,
that the languages and concepts of fear are not systematically coherent. Even though common
language,  whether  now  or  then,  encourages  us  to  think  the  opposite,  they  are  not
systematically coherent in our own time and they weren’t in Shakespeare’s time either.
That represents a challenge to analysis and interpretation. Recently a number of studies
of emotions in Shakespeare and his contemporaries have appeared, often focusing on the
constructedness of the affective life, with emphases on humoral psychology, theatrical
experience, religious doctrine, and the politics of theatre.3 But there has been little work
on fear,4 and little meta-analysis of the terms and concepts involved in the study of any
Shakespearean emotions, and therefore of the kinds of assumptions we bring to bear on
the study of them. In some ways, I hope to show, we have a relationship to fear which
Shakespeare  has  already  anticipated  and  rejected.  In  others,  we  have a  conceptual
apparatus that can help us understand Shakespearean texts in new ways, and which I do
not believe we should reject merely in the name of avoiding the bugbear of anachronism.
I am not a presentist,  but I  nevertheless believe that as long as we respect historical
difference we need not avoid and we need not fear insights into Shakespeare that depend
on our current preoccupations, vocabularies, and scientific insights.
5 And so first, fear itself, and the diversity of the meanings that can attributed to the root
term. As I have said, common language encourages us to think that “fear” is either a
single thing or a  group of  things systematically related to one another.  Of  the chief
reasons is that, in one of its manifestations, “fear” is used as an umbrella term, both for
different kinds of experiences that might be characterized as fearful and for experiences
which seem similar to fear but go by other terms– anxiety, panic, terror and the like. But
umbrella terms are philosophically and hermeneutically risky. The implication is that all
other terms, are species of a genus, fear, and that these other forms of experience come
out of fear, or descend or develop out of fear. But that is seldom how the English language
really works. That is seldom, as far as we can tell so far, how the mind works either.5
There  are  psychologists  and  cognitive  scientists  who  nevertheless  refer  to  “basic
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emotions” of which “fear” takes pride of place, and other emotions, like anxiety, are
gradations. Psychologists may differ in some details, but those who espouse the case for
basic emotions usually include (along with fear) disgust, anger, joy, sadness, love, and
surprise.6 There are no healthy human beings anywhere who do not experience these
emotions. They seem to involve activity in the same ostensibly primitive brain region
(primitive from an evolutionary point of  view),  and we share them with many other
animals. 
6 Yet there is a reductiveness in this reasoning, even when practiced under the rubric of
psychoanalysis, and a methodological hastiness as well.7 Is “sadness” really at heart one
kind of phenomena, and are phenomena like “grief” and “depression” really variants or
sub-species? Is a mother sad at the death of a child sad in the same way as a dog left alone
at home missing its master? Wittgenstein would probably say that “family resemblances”
have  been  mistaken  for  essences.  Ian  Hacking  would  say  that  psychology  has  been
mistaken for botany, complex psychological processes for lines of taxonomies based on
demonstrable  evolutionary  descent.8 Some  psychologists  argue  strenuously  that
psychological states should never be mistaken for “natural kinds.”9 Some would also say
that cognition has been left out of the picture.10 To be afraid is to be aware of something
and thus of something apprehended just as to be sad is usually to be sad about something.11 
Yet others would add that there are many somethings out there. So far as the brain is a
network of mappings and associations, there is seldom any one thing apprehended in the
mind that amounts to what may seem to be a singular emotion.12 To be sure, we can
locate neural activity that is triggered in cases of what is often called “fear,” located first
of all in the amygdala, which is connected to the more extensive limbic system. But even
this idea of a location of emotion is subject to doubt, and so is the nature of the amygdala.
13 And our own language, and Shakespeare’s as well, tell us that what we think about
when we think about fear is much more complex and diverse than that. Language shows
us that fear and related terms are many things, not all of them entirely commensurate
with others. We need a lot of different words not only to express nuances, but to indicate
specific states and dispositions, whose differences are as important as their similarities.
7 Even the umbrella term is more complicated than at first appears. Consider one of the
most  famous  expressions  about  fear,  Franklin  Delano  Roosevelt’s  saying  “We  have
nothing to fear but fear itself.” Well,  maybe. But how does one fear fear? The saying
actually echoes a comment by Montaigne: “The thing in the world I am most afraid of is
fear.” (“C’est de quoi j’ai le plus de peur que la peur.”)14 But again, how does one do that,
and fear fear? It would seem possible only if two different meanings of fear are being
played with here, one being apprehensiveness about what may occur in the future, the
other a crippling worry in response to a present danger.  The only thing we have to
apprehensive about it is a future worry that will paralyze us, preventing us from taking
appropriate action. Fear here is two things rather than one. Consider next the entry in
the Oxford English Dictionary of fear. It says that fear is primarily “the emotion of pain or
uneasiness caused by the sense of impending danger, or by the prospect of some possible
evil”. But who thinks of fear as pain or uneasiness? When I am frightened by something, I
am not in pain,  and I  am not merely uneasy.  And is  there not a difference between
responding to an impending danger and a future prospect of evil? Words are hard to
define, of course. But the Oxford English Dictionary then goes on to refer to the use of the
word familiarly as an umbrella term, suggesting also that is used not to be so: Fear is
“now the general term for all degrees of the emotion,” it says; but “in early use applied to
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its more violent extremes, now denoted by alarm, terror, fright, dread.”15 We will actually
not find much substantiation for that last qualification in Shakespeare, who in fact uses
the term to denote anything from a rather mild worry about what may be in the future to
alarm concerning the present. But the upshot is clear. In English – I won’t speak for any
other languages here – fear seems to be one thing, but it  is actually many. If  fear is
commonly used as an umbrella term, moreover, it is used that way only at the price of
considerable ambiguity and confusion. The term fear – in early modern English the now
obsolete pleonasm “dread and fear” was common, as in The Rape of Lucrece’s “Till sable
night, mother of dread and fear”16 – encourages us to think there are many kinds of fear,
not all, even few of them being fearful in the same way. It is very hard, however, perhaps
impossible, to say exactly what makes them aligned.
8 Psychologists, to be sure, especially those inclined to think of “fear” as a primary or base
emotion,  and who in addition find explanatory power for the emotions in evolution,
commonly think of fear as an instinct-based physiological and/or neurological event that
provokes the subject into action: flight, fight, or paralysis. Faced with danger, I run away,
I confront my danger, or I freeze. Danger is key to fear in this sense. And the emotion –
the  Oxford  English  Dictionary allows  for  this  in  its  definition (3d)  –  is  that  feeling  or
apprehension that  something perilous  is  about  to  happen.  I  believe this  is  the  most
common understanding of the word today. That shocking feeling that I have to get away,
or take action, or that I need to do one or the other and am unable to do either, that
feeling that as it were assaults me, takes hold of me, given a possibly perilous future –
that is fear, in the first instance.17 
9 But there are other complications.  I  can experience fear when I  see someone else in
danger:  for example,  a child wandering too close to the edge of a platform in Metro
station. I experience fear for the child but in me. The flight, fight, or paralysis options work
much differently as a result, and they may be compared in this respect to the options I
experience emotionally when I see something fearful in a drama or a film. I experience
fear for the character in peril; but the emotional options are moot, since, unlike the child
in the Metro station, there is nothing I can possibly do for him or her. And then there is
the fear experienced which is not even fear for another. I am afraid that two cars on the
road ahead of me are going to crash into one another. And it is not because I have an
empathetic intimation of the people in the cars. I am afraid simply that a disaster is going
to happen, beyond my control. “Why do they run away?” asks Bottom, entering as an ass
in front of his friends. “This is a knavery to make me afeard” (3.1.100). The friends are
afraid of a man with the head of a beast. Bottom thinks he is being tricked into being
frightened by an unknown impending danger, signalled by people running away, about
which he will be able to do nothing. But he will not be afraid. So there is fear of an
impending unknown evil, and there is possible a resistance to the very concept of fear. (In
other words, one can articulate the abstraction, fear, without experiencing it.) 
10 In addition to these fears about known and unknown dangers, for oneself and for others,
there are also less objective fears: fears of strangeness, fears of disorientation, fears of
being abandoned and alone: children especially are prone to these fears, most popularly
in fears of the dark, of “sable night,” but of course adults can suffer from them too.18 All
of  these varieties of  feeling,  it  needs emphasizing,  can be found in Shakespeare,  and
perhaps other varieties not yet named. Consider another case from A Midsummer Night’s
Dream. When Hermia wakes up from a menacing dream in the middle of the forest, and
her lover Lysander is  nowhere to be seen,  she cries out,  “I  swoon almost with fear”
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(2.2.160). She is afraid for herself; she is afraid for Lysander. She is afraid in her current
condition, she is afraid because of what she saw in her dream, a snake eating her heart,
and she is afraid for the future. She is afraid, for the most part, not because a present
danger  has  alarmed  her,  but  rather  because  of  dangers  remembered  and  dangers
imagined.  She  is  afraid  of  the  strangeness  of  the  forest  and  its  darkness  and  the
apprehension that she is alone. She is afraid that Lysander will betray her. To her credit,
she does not allow herself to be paralyzed. She goes in search of Lysander, worrying that
if she does not find him she will die. In a sense, Hermia conquers her fears – an important
idea in Shakespeare, as we have already begun to see.
11 So in general  and certainly in the experience of Shakespearean characters,  there are
many kinds of fear, many objects, many imaginary objects, and many absences feared as ‐
if  they  were  objects.  There  are  even  several  different  kinds  of  fear  that  can  be
experienced together. But let us take it for granted for the time being that what we most
commonly mean by fear in the first  instance is  this impulse to fight,  flee,  or freeze,
keeping in mind that we have already located at least six alternatives, the “prospect of a
future evil,” the fear for another, the fear for a situation, the fear for a fictional character,
the  fear  of  strangeness  and  the  fear  of  being  alone.  Even  so,  then  come  all  those
companion terms. 
12 Anxiety is next on the list, and rightly so.19 Since the nineteenth century, anxiety has
been a key term for understanding not only psychology but the human condition in
general.  It  seems  to  be  especially  pertinent  today.  A  recent  search  of  the  MLA
International Bibliography shows over 4000 recent entries where a key word is anxiety;
and there are many scholarly articles and books which attribute anxiety to a condition of
or in Shakespearean drama. But why? I will get back to that. But first it needs to be noted
that  the  word  is  never  used  by  Shakespeare,  although  it  was  not  unknown  in  the
sixteenth  century.  Death  “is  a  remedy  moost  present  for  all  euyls,  and  the  chefest
expeller of al anxieties,” wrote William Hugh in 1549 – anxiety here apparently being
used, much like fear, as an umbrella term (Oxford English Dictionary: 1b). If we attribute
anxiety  to  a  condition  of  or  in  Shakespearean  drama  or  poetry  we  attribute  it  to
phenomena that Shakespeare does not name as such. Our own preoccupations are in play.
But that does not mean that the attribution is incorrect. Anxieties of various kinds –
“national anxiety,” “genealogical anxiety,” “cultural anxiety,” “the anxiety of deception,”
“ethical anxiety,” “sexual anxiety”, “racial anxiety” – have proliferated in early modern
studies, and even on the level of individual characters in early modern drama a condition
of what we call anxiety may sometimes be found – perhaps Hamlet, above all. Since W.H.
Auden’s poem by the name, from decade to decade intellectuals have been inclined to
think that we live in an “age of anxiety.” But if that is the case, when we are moved or
disturbed by Shakespearean phenomena we may be inclined to attribute to something
familiar from this our own age rather than his.
13 Is there is a base or first instance of meaning to the word anxiety? If so, it is probably this:
fear without a secure object. If fear is usually fear of something, anxiety is fear of nothing –
not of something here or there or of something gone missing, but precisely of nothing.
Hobbes described anxiety as a fear for the future, but in the sense that the future was not
something that could be known.20 It was not a thing. When Kierkegaard took up the topic,
this  psychological  condition  also  became  ontological,  epistemological,  ethical  and
ultimately  theological.  Kierkegaard  defines  anxiety  as  the  condition  of  sin,  of  the
fallenness that all of us share – or more positively, in a definition that resounds through
Shakespeare and the Concepts of Fear
Actes des congrès de la Société française Shakespeare, 36 | 2018
5
all existentialist thought, “freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility.”21 We are
all anxious because we have to be: the objects and stimuli of our life are not secure, and
we apprehend them insecurely, although at the same time we know that the insecurity of
our objects and stimuli are also indicators of our freedom, or rather of our ability to be
free, and that ability makes us leery; it makes us want to recline into the comfort of
dependency, of conventional thinking, of ideology and myth. Confronted with what we do
not know, we respond with anxiety; or else, we sense that we are really free and know
what we ought to do, but mainly in the sense that we only see the possibility of our being
free – not the thing, which doesn’t exist – and we are left with emptiness. If only we could
be dependent! If only we weren’t aware of the possibility of being free! For Heidegger
anxiety is the state of mind that reacts with alarm at “Being-in-the-world as such.”22 And
so again the problem of freedom comes into play: “Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its
Being  towards  its  own  inmost  potentiality-for-Being  –  that  is,  its  Being-free  for  the
freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself.”23
14 But there is  clinical  anxiety too,  a  mental  or emotional  disorder,  which is  not to be
underestimated: it afflicts hundreds of millions, forty million in the United States alone.24
Above  all  there  is  what  the  DSM-5 calls  “generalized  anxiety  disorder,”  a  prolonged
condition when no threats are perceived, when no danger, imaginary or real, lies in one’s
way; but when one is all the same afraid.25 Sometimes the word “hyper-arousal” is added.
The anxious person is stimulated by more than a situation warrants.26 Instead of being
normatively wary, the subject is pathologically vigilant, or, as we say, unnerved. It is my
impression that the use of the word “anxiety” in Shakespeare studies focuses on this later
idea of hyper-arousal, combining it with ideas, rooted in psychoanalysis, of repression
and displacement.27 The named phenomenon thus serves as both an acute symptom and a
hidden cause, often generalized as a social rather than a merely personal ill. That is not
what modern clinical psychology would recommend, for in most modern practice anxiety
is  an  observable  and  describable  syndrome,  not  something  hidden  away,  and  not
something driving us we know not where. And it is personal rather than social. We are in 
anxiety if we suffer from the disorder; the cure comes in individually finding our way out.
Yet in some cases, notwithstanding modern clinical psychology, some literary analysis
focussed on causal and symptomatic anxieties may be correct. In Freud’s later work, the
anxiety concerning something unknown, and unknown because it is repressed, expresses
itself in neurotic behaviour, for example hysteria and phobia. Repression comes first;
anxiety follows; and then the symptom follows after. But the symptom may well be not,
say, sexual paralysis or a phobic episode, but an anxiety attack.28 That is, the condition
may express itself as a condition, the hidden anxiety being also a visible knot of hyper-
aroused feelings and ideas. For anxiety is not just a condition; it is also an affect. Lacan
might agree, though Lacan insists that anxiety is not fear without an object; it is rather a
field of significant experience, where something has been at once lost and sought for: the
signifier. Anxiety is a tear, a cut, a rift in a chain of signification; and it is the condition
that makes it possible, even necessary, to confront the world with uneasy uncertainty.
Anxiety is a sign of helplessness in the face of the Real. It is even “a signal of the real.” 29
15 Next  on  the  list,  phobia,  already  mentioned  above,  is  another  word  not  present  in
Shakespeare, and not available to him either. It only entered our vocabulary in the 1950s.
Yet the phenomenon was not unknown in the early modern period. There may be some
examples in Shakespeare: Ford’s fear of cuckoldry in The Merry Wives of Windsor may be a
case in point, as may be Lucrece’s fear of the dark. Certainly there are several examples in
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the comedies of Ben Jonson, most notably Morose in Epicoene; or The Silent Woman, who is
phobic about noise. Robert Burton mentions a few; for example, fear of water, hydrophobia
.30 Phobia is fear attached to very specific objects or situations, which have no objective
facticity. A phobic individual experiences something like “fear” when no real danger is at
hand, but he or she becomes alarmed whenever a certain thing or situation is perceived
or anticipated which might be dangerous if comes into direct contact with either the
thing or the situation. A phobia can be terrifying. It can lead to panic, vertigo, revulsion.
And  when  it  is  developed  with  response  to  imaginary  objects,  to  mere  fantasies,  it
becomes what we call paranoia, the next term on our list. Paranoia is another term not
available to Shakespeare, but a case can be made that some of the obsessive fearfulness of
some of his characters can be denoted by the term. It has been argued, for example, that
Macbeth comes to suffer paranoia.31 The problem with saying that Macbeth is paranoid,
however,  is  that  many  of  his  fears  turn  out  to  be  right.  In  Macbeth Shakespeare
dramatizes a tragic version of an old joke: “Just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean
they aren’t after you.” Interestingly, both phobia and paranoia appear to be univocal
terms. It may be argued in any given case whether phobia or paranoia are present; but
common language and clinical language both are pretty clear about what they refer to. (A
complication arises with terms like “homophobia,” where fear is mixed with hatred.)
16 So, fear, anxiety, phobia and paranoia. Next on the list is obsessive compulsion, a fear
which is not so much felt or consciously recognised as it is acted out: here the object and
stimulus are present, but they present something that is not really there. The obsessive
compulsive is afraid because of a compulsion to be afraid, and luckily, unlike the person
suffering from generalized anxiety, he or she has a remedy at hand, an obsessive ritual.
Shakespeare’s Lady Macbeth is sometimes said to suffer from this syndrome,32 but in Lady
Macbeth’s case the ritual is ineffective, and the end result is suicide. She compulsively
washes her hands, but without any effect. Apparently this is not to be unexpected; it has
been shown that OCD sufferers have a much higher rate of suicide and suicide attempts
than the average population.33
17 Panic comes next. If fear is the apprehension of danger which may lead to an impulse of
flight, fight, or paralysis, panic can occur either with or without a genuine apprehension
of danger. It is an experience of fear or anxiety that causes the individual (or sometimes
whole crowds) to spin out of control, to act wildly, hysterically, irrationally, destructively,
the body breaking down under the weight of its own fright, the mind struggling to think
what it is thinking. An impulse neither to fly, fight, or remain still, panic is a vertiginous,
trembling, or raging condition, which may then lead either to nervous paralysis or an
irrational acting out. Panic attacks, a common complaint today, are similar to what in
early modern England were sometimes called furies or fits, although in the furies panic
turns to anger, whereas in panic attacks anger is unavailable as an outlet. Shakespeare
does  not  use  the  term.  But  it  is  possible  that  what  Othello  suffers  when,  as  stage
directions put it, he “falls into a trance” is a panic attack (4.1.41). He falls into a trance
because he fears the implications of his suspicions about Desdemona: his own absurdity,
his own violence, his own freedom to do evil. It is also possible to name what Macbeth
feels when he sees Banquo’s ghost a panic attack. Lady Macbeth calls what he experiences
a “fit,” a “momentary” fit – although again, his panic attack may be a symptom of a
general condition of paranoia (Macbeth, 3.4.54). Montaigne, in his essay on fear, refers to
the wild behaviour of troops in the face of danger as a “terreur panique.”34 In Florio’s
translation of Montaigne, the same expression is translated as “panic terror.”35
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18 Then there is dread, not a clinical term today and not much used anymore except to
indicate an intense fear which is mixed with aversion, provoking avoidance. The word in
Shakespeare is usually tamer than it is today, though it is frequently related not just to
aversion  and  avoidance  but  also  to  awe  and  submission,  especially  with  regard  to
sovereign authority. Powerful officials are dread lords, meaning I think dreaded lords, but
dreaded for the right reason; they are powerful; they command paramilitary retinues and
legal privileges; and they can do you harm. It is probably pertinent that Hamlet talks
about “the dread of something after death” and not “the fear” of it. That “dread” seems
to indicate intensity, aversion and awe all at once, with the hint that what is to be feared
in the afterlife is something sovereign and not be defied. One dreads what cannot be
avoided, because it is the law, but one wants to avoid it all the same, since it is, well,
dreadful.
19 There are companion terms that we use today that were not used by Shakespeare: worry,
solicitude, inhibition. I have not put them on the list, but I remark that these terms are
part our languages of fear; and if we say that a Shakespearean character or poetic speaker
is worried,  solicitous,  or inhibited we are not necessarily wrong. Many times when a
Shakespearean character says,  “I fear that …” or “I doubt that …”, we would use the
expression “I worry that …”, though that now common sense of the word “worry” only
comes to us from the nineteenth century.  If  ever Claudius and Gertrude are actually
worried for the health of Hamlet, and keen to do something about it, they are in our terms
not only worried but “solicitous”: a word available to Shakespeare but not common in his
period, and never used by him. As for inhibition, the psychological sense of the word
familiar to us today of an inner restraint, related to a conscious or unconscious fear of
what would happen if one were not restrained, was not available to Shakespeare. We
should be wary of that. But I find convincing a description of Romeo, where it is said that
by the end of the play he is “no longer the withdrawn inhibited character of Act One.”36
20 And again there are the twin concepts of terror and horror. They are not clinical terms,
but they are much with us today. They are so much with us today, since the French
Terror,  the  invention  of  horror  fiction,  the  coming  of  horror  movies,  the  terrorist
movements of the nineteenth and twentieth century, and all the publicity that terrorism
today  both  seeks  and  finds,  that  they  can  only  with  caution  be used  to  describe  a
Shakespearean phenomenon. However,  Shakespeare himself  uses the words,  and with
some consistency. As for terror, most dictionaries define it as being merely a heightened
degree of fear (regarding it as an umbrella term); but terror is traditionally associated, in
many European languages, with a fear that makes one tremble. Adriana Cavarero, who
has written at length on the subject, adds that this trembling is a motor force, sending the
body into motion in reaction to a perceived danger. A terrified person is apt to flee. As for
horror, Cavarera goes on to say, if terror is about trembling, horror is about bristling; it is
about the hair on the back of your head sticking out. More important to the meaning,
though, even for Cavarero, is the association of horror with aversion or disgust. Cavarero
contrasts horror with terror by adding that if terror makes one flee, the disgust of horror
leads  to  paralysis.37 The  distinction  is  interesting,  but  it  would  seem to  be  another
example of someone trying to pin down polysemantic terms in the name of scientific
clarity, even though the polysemanticism is part of what is important about the terms. If I
am terrified, I may well find myself paralyzed. If I am horrified, I may well flee the scene.
21 An important quality of both terror and horror (which Cavarero does not account for) is
that they can be used to designate either the quality of thing or person that causes them,
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or else the condition of being terrified or horrified. When a headline today says, “Terror
in the streets of …,” it is following this tradition, for there is both something terrible in
the streets and people who are terrified. Especially with the word terror, Shakespeare
prefers to use it for the cause rather than the effect, often applied to powerful magnates.
“What a terror he had been to France”, says Talbot about Salisbury (1 Henry VI, 2.2.17).
“[We] lent him our terror, dressed him with our love” says the Duke about Claudius (
Measure for Measure, 1.1.19).38 Shakespeare does sometimes use the word to designate the
state  of  being  terrified,  to  be  sure  (he  never  uses  either  “terrified”  or  “terrorized”,
though he does use the cognate “terrible”): Says Lucrece to Tarquin:
The guilt being great, the fear doth still exceed; 
And extreme fear can neither fight nor fly,
But coward-like with trembling terror die (The Rape of Lucrece, 225-231).
22 But perhaps even in this last example, Shakespeare seems to link the emotion of terror to
objective  conditions  which  are  found  not  only  in  the  body  of  the  terrorized,  like
trembling,  but  in  the  world  itself.  Natural  and  even  supernatural  enormities  are
sometimes associated by the playwright with terror: “Methinks King Richard and I should
meet / With no less terror than the elements”, says Bolingbroke (Richard II, 3.3.53-54).
Cassius refers to “The unaccustomed terror of this night,” meaning both the storm and
the “apparent  prodigies” people report  having seen and heard (Julius  Caesar 2.1.199).
Macbeth, using the cognate, says that he has “terrible dreams” and he tells Lady Macbeth
about murders “too terrible” to be spoken about (3.2.20). Although it may be acceptable
to say today that terror is an “extreme fear,” and even Shakespeare has equated the two
in the example from Lucrece, Shakespeare is more apt to frame terror less as a fearfulness
than as a perception of a disturbance in the order of things, a disturbance which cannot
be fought against, and probably cannot be fled from either – which is part of what it
“terrible” about it.39 Or else, he uses it to refer to magnates like Henry V bespeaking their
own lawful terror
23 As for horror, it is a rare word in Shakespeare, but when it appears it communicates
powerfully. When Macduff finds the body of Duncan, recently and secretly murdered by
Macbeth, he cries out “O horror, horror, horror! Tongue nor heart / Cannot conceive nor
name thee” (Macbeth, 2.3.59). The cognate term “horrible” is used similarly, designating
something that  is  at  once frightful  and taboo,  almost  inconceivable,  not  to  mention
disgusting. The ghost of Banquo for example is a “horrible sight” (Macbeth 4.2.138). And
then of  course  comes  Hamlet’s  ghost,  reporting  on life  in  Purgatory:  “O horrible!  O
horrible! Most horrible!” (Hamlet Q2, 1.5.80)
24 Last comes awe, a concept already included in the idea of dread, but a concept with a
range of references all its own. In brief, awe is in the first instance a combination of fear
and reverence. It was common in Shakespeare’s England to speak of the awe of God – and
the problem with such awe, if it is applied to responses to any object but God, is that it
demands that we love the thing that overwhelms us, that reduces us and makes us timid.
Threatens Henry V, “France being ours, we’ll bend it to our awe” (Henry V, 1.2.224). But
note again, like terror and horror, awe can refer either to a subjective state or to the
object that causes it. The awe of God or King is at once part of what it means to be God or
a King and part of what it means to experience what God or a King are – to me. But the
concept of awe is precisely what Cassius contests in Julius Caesar, speaking to Brutus: 
[…] for my single self,
I had as lief not be as live to be
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In awe of such a thing as I myself.
I was born free as Caesar; so were you (1.2.95-99).
The idea is that one cannot be in awe of someone to whom one is equal, especially if one
knows exactly what one is.
25 As already noted, I have also added to the list some expressions, “I fear that,” I am afraid
that…”, (or, in Shakespeare, “I am afeard that”), and “I dare not…”. It is important to note
these expressions because they indicate that fear is not just a substantive, but also a part
of the grammar of emotions. And sometimes, with these expressions, the concept of fear
merges with the concept of being sorry. That is, the expression indicates a concession to
the one who is spoken too. Says the computer Hal, in 2001: A Space Odyssey, when he is
commanded to open a hatch, “I’m sorry Dave, I’m afraid I can’t do that”.40 In addition, the
expressions “fear” or one of its cognates may function as a marker of a mood, what might
be called the negative subjunctive. Says Brutus in Julius Caesar, “I do fear, the people /
Choose Caesar for their king” (1.2.82-83). Says Cassius a little later, “I fear our purpose is
discovered.” (3.1.17).
26 And then there is the similar locution, to dare, or dare not. Says Alexis to Antony, in
Antony and Cleopatra: “Good majesty, Herod of Jewry dare not look upon you / But when
you are well pleased” (3.3.3). Says Scarus, a servant of Cleopatra, “the augurers / Say they
know not, they cannot tell; look grimly, / And dare not speak their knowledge” (4.13.4-6).
These expressions mark a kind of hesitation, mixed with uncertainty on the one hand and
dread of a bad outcome on the other. They avoid committal, and they incline toward
politeness – that is, toward saying not what one means, but rather saying a little bit less
than one means for the sake of propriety, congeniality and safety. And then there is a
locution  that  indicates  that  one  should  be  ready  for  something  that  one  may  fear:
wariness, as in to be wary, or more plainly, sometimes, beware. “Be wary then;” Laertes
says to Ophelia, “best safety lies in fear” (Hamlet Q2, 1.3.43). I hardly need mention the
wariness that Caesar is supposed to feel about the Ides of March. Wariness, it would seem,
is a self-defensive state of mind. 
27 So there are many kinds of fear, many uses of the word fear and its companion terms, and
many situations  in  which fear  or  its  companion terms are  useful  indicators  both of
objective  conditions  and  subjective  responses.  That  is  so  now,  and  that  was  so  in
Shakespeare’s  day.  A  problem comes  when  we  think  we  are  using  a  univocal  term.
Another problem comes when we think that in referring to an affect like fear, we are
referring to only an affect, only a subjective condition. Such an idea indicates a bias at
least as old as William James, if not Descartes, where the affective life is psychological life,
and psychological life is rooted in the physiology of the body. Such an idea also correlates
with  a  bias  as  old  as  Plato  but  that  is  especially  pertinent  today,  in  this  age  of
neoliberalism, where phenomena like emotions are understood to be subjective states
subject to management and therapeutic intervention. I do not, as I have indicated, object
to using terms from today to describe phenomena in Shakespeare. But I think we need to
be cautious in how we use them. We need to be especially cautious about thinking that
just because we have landed on a medical term and its analysis that Shakespeare may
have been familiar with, we have an infallible key to Shakespearean discourse. 
28 Agreed: there are corporeal and clinical subjective conditions with which Shakespeare
was familiar and which helped him express human emotion, even taught him how to
express it. But what many accounts are leaving out is the prodigiousness of Shakespeare’s
simulations of the human. Shakespeare can well regard the fears of his dramatis personae
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as being in some sense sick, or at least expressive of a character flaw. But that is only the
beginning. He may also have them (and his speakers in poetry) distinguish between fears
of present danger and fears for a danger to come. He may show characters and poetic
subjects suffering from cowardice in the face of minor evils and anxiety in the face of
they know not what. He may show them terrified or horrified, or awestruck by the power
of magnates or the supernatural. He can show them obsessive or in panic. He can show
them engaging in a grammar of fear partly out of respect for their interlocutors and
partly out of respect for their own uncertainties. 
29 But that is not all. For Shakespeare also consistently shows the varieties of fears as being
bound with social, political and moral life, with concepts of justice, virtue, inequality,
spiritual dignity and the historical moment. He thus also shows them (as we have already
seen in the case of “terror”) being tied to objective conditions, or conditions that are
taken to be objective, which bear upon historical circumstances as well as what might be
taken as human nature.
30 To  illustrate  that  point,  and  provide  a  preliminary  conclusion,  let  me  make  a  few
remarks, as I have promised, about one of Shakespeare’s great assassins, Hamlet. I have
already noted a few varieties of the concept of fear in the Hamlet play. And I have hinted,
too, that though the concept of anxiety goes unnamed in all of Shakespeare’s work, it is
plausible to claim that Hamlet himself labours under a condition of anxiety. The idea is
not new. Kierkegaard made the claim, saying that Hamlet suffered from religious doubt
and all that entailed, including an inescapable sense of original sin, and of bearing the
responsibility  for  a  crime he did not  commit.41 The clinically  minded may also have
reason to think that the character of Hamlet expresses a simulation of general anxiety,
which is  commonly coupled (we now know from a clinical  point  of  view) with what
Hamlet himself tells us he suffers from, melancholy – what today we call depression – as
well as a sense of indeterminate guilt. Are we wrong to think that way? Again, simulations
of these conditions are what is at stake, not the real thing. But why couldn’t Shakespeare
have simulated them, even if he sometimes lacked a clinical category for naming them? In
fact, in Hamlet the playwright calls attention to the puzzling namelessness for Hamlet’s
situation. And he does so by underscoring the non-anxious forms of fear that Hamlet does
not  suffer.  For  again,  the  very  idea  of  fears  of  various  kinds  are  connected in
Shakespeare’s work with ostensibly objective conditions.
31 Consider part of a speech by Hamlet, in act two:42
Am I a coward?
Who calls me villain? breaks my pate across?
Plucks off my beard, and blows it in my face?
Tweaks me by the nose? gives me the lie i’ the throat, carve
As deep as to the lungs? Who does me this? 
Ha? (Hamlet Q2, 2.2.506-511)
Am I a coward? The answer is no. Because if someone defied me directly I would not be
afraid. I would act. So I am not afraid. It is not fear that holds me back, or not the fear
that gets expressed through paralysis or flight in the face of impending danger. But what
then? What empirically do I suffer from? Consider what Hamlet compares himself to in
this  speech – a rogue,  a  peasant slave,  an ass and a prostitute.  In such comparisons
Hamlet ventures the idea that the resistance to fear – the quality called courage – is not
only subjective and personal, but also objective, socially and morally and maybe even
ontologically. By hesitating to act, Hamlet says, I am acting like a rogue, a peasant slave,
and so on. This quality in Hamlet which today we might call  anxiety is compared by
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Hamlet himself to the kind of timidity that belongs objectively either to someone on the
margins of society, a rogue, or to someone at the very bottom of society, a peasant and a
slave, not to mention an ass or a whore. To be at the top of society, in this view, to be a
prince, means first of all not to be afraid.
32 The emphasis continues in the fourth act, where Hamlet discusses cowardice. 
Now, whether it be
Bestial oblivion, or some craven scruple
Of thinking too precisely on the event,
A thought which, quartered, hath but one part wisdom
And ever three parts coward […] (Hamlet Q2, 4.4.38-42).
“Bestial oblivion” – in other words not thinking like a rational human being. To be timid
is to be irrational, or at least, not rational enough to realise that there is more to life than
eating and sleeping: that life is made for the achievement of honour, first of all. In this
case we find Hamlet subscribing to what is technically called a deontological ethic, and
also sometimes an ethic of the virtues. And then there is the problem of “craven scruple”
– in other words, thinking too much, hiding behind too much rationality. That too leads
to a kind of fear – the fear that leads to paralysis. Coleridge, it will be recalled, saw this as
the “overbalance of the imaginative power” in relation to reason. “Thinking too precisely
on an event”- Camillo, in The Winter’s Tale, makes just the same sort of observation.43 In
these situations it may be pertinent to observe that “thinking” turns into fantasizing,
although the fantasy itself is made out of rational considerations.
33 So we see that being afraid, for Hamlet, in the sense of being unable to act, in the sense of
responding to danger with ignoble paralysis, is associated with being socially marginal,
mandatorily  submissive,  irrational,  or  overly  precise.  Or  else,  it  is  associated  with
something  that  goes  unnamed,  which  is  not  fear.  So  again  our  word  for  Hamlet’s
condition might well be anxiety, and this anxiety may even be exasperated by Hamlet’s
not having a word (or an explanation) for it.44 To have a diagnosis can be reassuring: “I
know what’s wrong with me!” Anxiety of some sort in any case may be the general status
of Hamlet’s mind throughout the play, and there are many examples of specific addresses
to the problem. Hyper-arousal, for instance, may be observed in his confrontations with
Ophelia and Gertrude. And then there are reflective accounts, as when, in response to
Horatio, Hamlet being about to enter his fencing match with Laertes, Hamlet says: “But
thou wouldst not think how ill all’s here about my heart.” Remember, this is after Hamlet
has also said that he is not afraid about the match. He thinks he is going to win, but
nevertheless “all’s here” is “ill.”
34 But not having a word for his condition, Hamlet only notes that in a variety of ways
something about him, not about the world, but about himself, is wrong. And remember
too: the official cover for his timidity is madness. In the legends and in the Shakespearean
play Hamlet’s paralysis is excused by Hamlet’s madness. If he were sane he would be
dangerous and revenge his father; as he is mad he needs to be watched, worried about but
not dreaded. 
35 All that being said, I must add that calling Hamlet anxious by itself explains very little. My
own use of the term here is not a clinical diagnosis of a fictional person; it is rather the
finding of a strain of resemblances and patterns in the simulation of a life which we have
now come to associate with the term anxiety. Again, as long as this caveat is understood,
and that no essentialism or reductivism need be involved, I think there is no hermeneutic
mistake  involved  in  using  the  word,  no  more  than  in  writing  about  “splitting
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subjectivities” or “self-fashionings” or “misogyny” in Shakespeare’s work. Rather,  the
work can help us look outward, for the question of anxiety, as I have argued, ranges from
the  fact  of  a  discreet  emotion  to  a  philosophical  enigma  regarding  the  meaning  of
freedom and unfreedom. But calling Hamlet anxious may at least clarify some of the
stakes involved in applying the concepts of fear of both our own day and Shakespeare’s to
the analysis of Shakespeare’s plays and poems.
36 Hamlet is one among many other examples in Shakespeare that may well require us to
challenge the medical regime I referred to, and to strains in modern cognitive science as
well. In the societies of Hamlet, the kind of fear that physicians and cognitive scientists
warn us against is the least of our worries. In the world of Hamlet fear is embedded in the
subject not only as an emotional response to danger, but also, along with its opposite,
courage, in the subject’s constitutions as moral, political and social beings. The fear of
present danger is, among many other of Shakespeare’s virtuous aristocrats, a thing of no
account. It is deplorable. “Cowards die many times before their deaths;” says Julius
Caesar. “The valiant never taste of death but once” (2.2.32-33). But the fear of future
danger, of dangers not completely understood, or not entirely believed in, and possibly
imaginary to boot, the fear of the consequences of actions we have not yet undertaken,
along with the fear of the consequences that might come if we do not act, especially
perhaps if we find that what inhibits us is an intangible and inexcusable awe, based on a
failure  to  appreciate  our  own  dignity  –  this  is  one  the  great  fears  (or  anxieties  or
obsessions) among Shakespeare’s armed male elite. Of course, only some of Shakespeare’s
characters belong to that class.
37 The field for research lies before us. To what the research will lead I dare not say. But I
end with a simple plea.  Be wary of what you are saying.  And don’t let the cognitive
scientists dictate what to talk about when you talk about fear in Shakespeare.
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ABSTRACTS
Fear and its companion terms like anxiety, terror, and panic are not systematically related. Our
attempts to conceptualize fear and related phenomena are often hampered by assumptions that
there is a system of natural kinds in the emotions, when at best there are only what Wittgenstein
called family resemblances. There is no one reliable system now and there was no reliable system
in Shakespeare’s period. This essay examines a variety of terms used to account for phenomena
like fear in Shakespeare, as well as the variety of concepts behind the terms. It highlights the
hermeneutic  challenges  posed by  fear’s  polysemanticity,  and by  the  copiousness  with  which
Shakespeare explores all the concepts.
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Lorsque l’on pense à la peur, on ne mobilise pas toujours les mots de sens voisin comme anxiété,
terreur et panique. Si l’on essaie de conceptualiser la peur et les phénomènes proches, on est
souvent gêné par le présupposé qu’il existe un système de types naturels parmi les émotions,
alors qu’il y a tout au plus ce que Wittgenstein appelle « un air de famille ». Il n’existe pas de
système fiable  de nos jours,  et  il  n’en existait  pas  non plus  du temps de Shakespeare.  Cette
contribution étudie un éventail de termes que l’on utilise pour rendre compte de phénomènes
tels que la peur chez Shakespeare, ainsi que les différents concepts correspondant à ces termes.
Elle met en lumière les défis herméneutiques que posent d’une part le caractère polysémique de
la peur, et de l’autre la richesse de l’exploration shakespearienne de tous ces concepts.
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